FPCON MEASURES

- What the Pentagon controlled guards do.
- What we do ourselves.
- What both of us do together.
- Does not apply to us, or may be done by a local police department, etc.

The text on the following slides is color coded to represent who has responsibility for imposing that particular measure.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON NORMAL

1. Secure and randomly inspect buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use.
2. Conduct random security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States.
3. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

We have not been in this condition since prior to 9-11-01. For the most part Alpha is our new normal for now.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON ALPHA

1. Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON.
2. At regular intervals, inform personnel and family members of the general situation. Ensure personnel arriving for duty are briefed on the threat. Also, remind them to be alert for and report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels, and possible surveillance attempts.
3. The duty office or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Plans should be in place to execute access control procedures. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available.
4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and person entering installations under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON ALPHA

(continued)

5. Initiate food and water Operational Risk Management (ORM) procedures, brief personnel on food and water security procedures, and report any unusual activities.
6. Test mass notification system.
7. Review all plans, identify resource requirements, and be prepared to implement higher FPCONs.
8. Review and, if necessary, implement security measures for high-risk personnel.
9. As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.
10. Review intelligence, counter intelligence, and operations dissemination procedures.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON BRAVO

1. Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCONs.
2. Enforce control of entry onto U.S. infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment, lucrative targets, and high profile locations; and randomly search vehicles entering these areas. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large IED (cargo vans, delivery vehicles) sufficient to cause catastrophic damage or loss of life.
3. Identify critical and high occupancy buildings. Keep cars and objects (e.g. crates, trash containers) away from buildings to reduce vulnerability to bomb attacks. Apply this criterion to all inhabited structures to the greatest extent possible. Standoff distance should be determined by the following factors: asset criticality; the protection level provided by structure, IED/Vehicle Borne IED threat; and available security measures. Consider centralized parking.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON BRAVO

(continued)

4. Secure and inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
5. At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at random intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.
6. Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels.
7. Randomly inspect commercial deliveries. Advise family members to check home deliveries.
8. Randomly inspect food and water for evidence of tampering/contamination before use by DoD personnel. Inspections should include delivery vehicles and storage area/containers.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON BRAVO

(continued)

9. Increase security/guard presence or patrol/surveillance of DoD housing areas, schools, messes, on-base clubs, and similar high-occupancy targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and family members.
10. Implement plans to enhance off-installation security of DoD facilities. In areas with Threat Levels of Moderate, Significant, or High, coverage includes facilities (e.g., DoD schools and daycare centers) and transportation services and routes (e.g., bus routes) used by DoD employees and family members.
11. Inform local security committees of actions being taken.
12. Verify identity of visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.
13. Conduct random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

FPCON BRAVO

(continued)

14. As necessary, implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel.
15. Place personnel required for implementing AT plans on call; commanders should exercise discretion in approving absences.
16. Identify and brief personnel who may augment guard forces. Review specific rules of engagement including the use of deadly force.
17. As deemed appropriate, verify identity of personnel entering buildings.
18. Review status and adjust as appropriate OPSEC, COMSEC, and INFOSEC procedures.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON BRAVO

(continued)

19. (Airfield specific) As appropriate, erect barriers and man and establish checkpoints at entrances to airfields. Ensure identity of all individuals entering the airfield (flight line and support facilities) – no exceptions. Randomly inspect vehicles, briefcases and packages entering the airfield.
20. (Airfield specific) Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraft departure and approach flight paths with local authorities. Be prepared to activate contingency plans and issue detailed air traffic control procedures. As appropriate, take actions to mitigate threat of surface-to-air missiles or standoff weapons that can be delivered from beyond the airfield perimeter.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON CHARLIE

1. Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON.
2. Recall additional required personnel. Ensure armed augmentation security personnel are aware of current rules of engagement and SOFAs. Review types of weapons and ammunition issued to augmentation security personnel; heightened threats may require employment of different weapons capabilities.
3. Be prepared to react to requests for assistance, from both local authorities and other installations in the region.
4. Limit access points to strictly enforce entry. Randomly search vehicles.
5. Ensure or verify identity of all individuals entering food and water storage and distribution centers, use sign in/out logs at access control/entry points, and limit and/or inspect all personal items.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON CHARLIE

(continued)

6. Initiate contingency monitoring for biological and chemical agents as required. Suspend contractor/off-facility users from tapping into facility water system (alternate locally developed measure should be executed when contractors are responsible for DoD water supplies or when water is provided by local (non-DoD) sources or agencies).
7. Increase standoff from sensitive buildings based on threat. Implement barrier plan to hinder vehicle borne attack.
8. Increase patrolling of the facility to include waterside perimeters, if appropriate. Be prepared to assist local authorities in searching for threatening actions/persons outside the facility perimeter. For airfields, patrol or provide observation of approach and departure flight corridors as appropriate to the threat (coordinate with TSA, Marine Patrol, U.S.C.G., and local law enforcement as required to cover off-facility approach and departure flight corridors).

FPCON CHARLIE

(continued)

9. Protect all designated infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment. Give special attention to and coordinate with local authorities regarding infrastructure outside the military establishment.
10. To reduce vulnerability to attack, consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities and coordinate any other precautionary measures taken outside the installation perimeter.
11. Consider searching suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., being brought onto the installation through access control points and consider randomly searching suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., leaving.

FPCON CHARLIE

(continued)

12. Review personnel policy procedures to determine course of action for family members.
13. Review access procedures for all non-U.S. personnel and adjust as appropriate. For airfields, consider terminating visitor access to the flight line and support facilities.
14. Consider escorting children to and from DoD schools (among options to consider are escorting school buses, recommending parents escort children to/from school, etc.).
15. (Airfield specific) Reduce flying to essential operational flights only. Implement appropriate flying countermeasures as directed by the Flight Wing Commander (military aircraft) or TSA (civilian aircraft). Consider relief landing ground actions to take for aircraft diversions into an out of an attacked airfield. Consider augmenting fire-fighting details.

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON DELTA

1. Continue, or introduce, all measures in previous FPCON.
2. Augment guards as necessary.
3. Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas.
4. Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation. Selected pre-screened and constantly secured vehicles used to transport escorted very important personnel are exempted.
5. Control facility access and implement positive identification of all personnel—no exceptions.
6. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the installation.
7. Close DoD schools and/or escort children to/from DoD

Guards

CNI

Both

NA

FPCON DELTA

(continued)

8. Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.
9. Restrict all non-essential movement.
10. (Air field specific) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized operational sorties. Be prepared to deploy light aircraft and/or helicopters for surveillance tasks or to move internal security forces. Implement, if necessary, appropriate flying countermeasures.
11. (Air field specific) As appropriate, airfields should prepare to accept aircraft diverted from other stations.
12. If permitted, close public and military roads and facilities. If applicable, close military roads allowing access to the airfield.